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We report a series of experiments carried out with Palestinian and
Israeli participants showing that violent opposition to compromise
over issues considered sacred is (i) increased by offering material
incentives to compromise but (ii) decreased when the adversary
makes symbolic compromises over their own sacred values. These
results demonstrate some of the unique properties of reasoning
and decision-making over sacred values. We show that the use of
material incentives to promote the peaceful resolution of political
and cultural conﬂicts may backﬁre when adversaries treat con-
tested issues as sacred values.
cultural conﬂict  Middle East conﬂict  negotiation  sacred values
Current approaches to resolving resource conflicts (1) orcountering political violence (2) assume that adversaries
make instrumentally rational choices. However, adversaries in
violent political conflicts often conceptualize the issues under
dispute as sacred values (3–7), such as when groups of people
transform land from a simple resource into a ‘‘holy site’’ to which
they may have noninstrumental moral commitments. Nowhere is
this issue more pressing than in the Israeli–Palestinian dispute,
which people across the world consistently view as the greatest
danger to world peace (8). We conducted experiments with
representative samples of Palestinian members of Hamas, Pal-
estinian refugees, and Jewish Israeli settlers to investigate
whether decisions about sacred values are noninstrumental.
Instrumental decision-making involves cost–benefit calcula-
tions regarding goals and entails abandoning or adjusting goals
if the costs outweigh the benefits. Although the field of judgment
and decision-making has made enormous progress (9, 10), much
more is known about economic decision-making than about
behavior motivated by moral considerations. In particular, there
is relatively little knowledge, study, or theoretical discussion of
sacred values, which differ from instrumental values by incor-
porating moral (including religious) beliefs (3, 4) that may drive
action (5) ‘‘independently of its prospect of success’’ (6). In
laboratory experiments, conducted primarily among North
American undergraduate students using nonrealistic hypothet-
ical scenarios, people asked to trade off sacred values for
instrumental rewards tend to react with outrage and anger,
although they may be able to accept trading off one sacred value
for another (11–13). The relative ease at which commitments to
sacred values are modified in these experiments has led to claims
that sacred values are merely ‘‘pseudosacred’’ and that if the
costs of a sacred value become too extreme, or the benefit of
compromising becomes too great, humans are adept at compro-
mising ostensibly categorical moral commitments (13).
To determine whether reasoning about sacred values is non-
instrumental, we conducted field experiments with Palestinians
and Jewish Israelis. These experiments differed from previous
research in that they focused on issues fundamental to a real
political dispute, on issues that are centrally important to the
lives of our participants who are key players in the dispute, and
used tradeoff scenarios that were realistic. Thus, we were able to
evaluate both (i) whether commitments to sacred values are
vulnerable to instrumental calculations and (ii) the way reason-
ing about sacred values influences the ability to generate peace-
ful resolutions to violent political disputes such as the Israeli–
Palestinian conflict.
Our experiments tested the general hypothesis that, when
reasoning about sacred values, people would not apply instru-
mental (cost–benefit) calculations but would instead apply de-
ontological (moral) rules or intuitions. We predicted that rea-
soning about sacred values would be noninstrumental in two
respects. First, just as religion forbids any mingling of the sacred
with the profane (14), we speculated that people follow a
deontological rule or intuition that forbids any attempt to
measure moral commitments to sacred values along an instru-
mental metric. We expected that people would react with
outrage and support violent opposition to any attempt at com-
promise over sacred values for instrumental reasons. Moreover,
we predicted that stronger incentives to compromise would
backfire, because the more salient the attempt to measure sacred
values along an instrumental scale, the greater the level of
outrage would be. Thus, we hypothesized that adding instru-
mental benefits to compromise over important issues in a violent
political conflict would ironically and irrationally increase out-
rage and opposition to compromise when those issues had been
converted, in the minds of the antagonists, into sacred values.
Although people may resist any attempt to buy off their moral
commitments to sacred values, this does not mean that sacred
values are of infinite value. Apparently, people are able to
measure the relative worth of sacred values they hold and trade
off these values when they come into conflict (11–13). The
second hypothesis we tested was that antagonism to compromise
over sacred values would be mitigated by equitable losses over
sacred values by both sides. People appear to have a desire for
equitable outcomes that is pursued with a disregard to instru-
mental consequences (15). Thus, we predicted that those who
hold sacred values would be less antagonistic to compromise
over those values if the adversary suffers a similar loss over their
own sacred values, even if the adversaries’ loss does not instru-
mentally alter the compromise deal at hand.
We tested these hypotheses in field experiments integrated
within surveys of three populations living in the West Bank and
Gaza who are key players in the Israeli–Palestinian dispute (16):
601 Jewish Israeli ‘‘settlers’’ (many settlers would be required to
evacuate their homes and communities to create a viable Pal-
estinian state); 535 Palestinian refugees (the claim of Palestinian
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refugees to a right of return represents a major obstacle to a
two-state solution) (17); and 719 Palestinian students, half of
whom identified themselves with Hamas or its smaller Islamist
ally Palestinian Islamic Jihad (the majority of Palestinian suicide
bombers have been student members of Hamas). See supporting
information (SI) for an expanded discussion of methods and
analysis.
We measured emotional outrage and propensity for violence
in response to peace deals involving compromises over issues
integral to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict (16, 18): exchanging
land for peace (in experiments with settlers); sovereignty over
Jerusalem (in experiments with Palestinian students); the right
of Palestinian refugees to return to their former lands and homes
inside Israel (in experiments with Palestinian refugees); and
recognition of the validity of the adversary’s own sacred values
(in each sample).
These deals (see Methods) were all hypothetical, but involved
compromises that are broadly typical of the types of solutions
that are frequently offered within political discourse in the
region. In our experiments, all participants were opposed to
compromise over these issues. In addition, a subset of partici-
pants indicated that they had transformed this preference into a
sacred value, opposing any tradeoff over the relevant issue in
exchange for peace no matter how great the benefit to their
people.
Our aim was to compare reactions to different types of deals
between these two subsets of participants: (i) moral-absolutists
who had transformed the issues under dispute into sacred values;
and (ii) non-absolutists who had strong preferences against
compromise over these issues but did not regard them as sacred
values. Among settlers, 46% of the sample believed that it was
never permissible for the Jewish people to ‘‘give up’’ part of the
‘‘Land of Israel’’ no matter how great the benefit. This group
contained moral-absolutists with respect to the Land of Israel
and may be distinguished from the remainder of settlers who,
although opposing ceding land, did not rule out treating land as
a fungible resource under extreme circumstances. Among Pal-
estinian students, 54% treated both the principle of the ‘‘right of
return’’ and Jerusalem as sacred values. In the Palestinian
refugee survey, 80% of participants were moral-absolutists
with respect to the principle of the right of return for Palestinian
refugees.
In each experiment, one-third of our participants were ran-
domly selected to respond to a peace deal that involved a
significant compromise over an important issue in exchange for
peace (Taboo deal, see Methods). For example, Israeli settlers
responded to deals that entailed Israeli withdrawal from 99% of
the West Bank and Gaza in exchange for peace, Palestinian
refugees responded to deals that violated the Palestinian right of
return, and Palestinian students responded to a deal that called
for the recognition of the legitimacy of the State of Israel. For
the moral-absolutists, these deals involved a taboo tradeoff (19)
over sacred values; for the non-absolutists, these deals involved
compromise over strong preferences (20). Another third of our
participants were randomly selected to respond to the same
taboo deal with an added instrumental incentive, such as money
or a life free of violence (Taboo). The remainder of our
participants responded to the taboo deal without an added
instrumental incentive but where the adversary also made a
taboo tradeoff over one of their own sacred values in a manner
that was designed to not add instrumental value to the deal nor
detract from the taboo nature of the deal (Symbolic).
From a rational perspective, the added instrumental incentive
in the Taboo deal means that those responding to the Taboo
deal should show less outrage and lower preferences for violent
opposition compared with those responding to the Taboo deal.
Although this was the case for non-absolutists who had a strong
preference against compromise, moral-absolutists showed the
opposite response: enhancing the instrumental value of the
tradeoff increased rather than decreased their emotional out-
rage and their support for violent opposition to the deal (see Fig.
1). This different pattern of reactions to added instrumental
incentives was observed in all experiments with Palestinian
students and Jewish settlers with respect to support for violent
a
b
c
d
Fig. 1. Palestinians responded to either Taboo peace deals or Taboo peace
deals, which were taboo deals with an added material incentive such as money.
(a and b) Palestinian recognition of the sacred right of Israel. (c and d) Compro-
mising Palestinian sovereignty over East Jerusalem. Ironically, adding material
incentives to compromise yielded more anger and disgust (a and c) and greater
support for violent opposition (b and d) from moral-absolutists for whom deals
involved compromises over sacred values. In contrast, non-absolutists for whom
deals involved compromises over strong preferences behaved in an instrumen-
tally rational manner; adding material incentives resulted in less opposition to
compromise. All measures were mean centered, and error bars report standard
errors. In experiments with Israeli settlers the same pattern emerged.
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responses (all P values 0.0065, one-tailed t test) and emotional
outrage in response to peace deals (all P values  0.0025,
one-tailed t test). Responses of moral-absolutist Palestinian
refugees showed the same pattern as moral-absolutist Jewish
settlers and Palestinian students.
Although added instrumental benefits increased opposition to
compromises over sacred values, we found that opposition
decreased when the deal included the adversary making a
symbolic compromise over one of their own sacred values (see
Fig. 2). This pattern was observed for: (i) measures of emotional
outrage to peace deals among moral-absolutist Palestinian stu-
dents (all P values  0.0075, one-tailed t test), Jewish settlers
(P  0.0025, one-tailed t test), and Palestinian refugees (P 
0.0045, one-tailed t test); and (ii) measures of support for
violence to oppose peace deals among moral-absolutist Jewish
settlers (P  0.06, one-tailed t test) and Palestinian refugees (all
P values 0.007, one-tailed t test). Importantly, symbolic con-
cessions did not seem to enhance confidence in the likelihood
that peace deals would be ‘‘peacefully and successfully imple-
mented,’’ leading to a Palestinian state (for Palestinians) or
peace (for both Palestinians and Israelis). Symbolic concessions
notably reduced extreme opposition to peace deals on the part
of moral-absolutists. For example, among Palestinian students,
the predicted odds of expressing intense anger and disgust at the
peace deals (defined by scoring one standard deviation above the
grand mean) decreased by a multiplicative factor of 0.518
(Wald  6.041, P  0.014) in response to symbolic Israeli
concessions over sacred values; among Israeli settlers intense
support for a violent response decreased by a multiplicative
factor of 0.25 (Wald 6.779, P 0.003) in response to symbolic
Palestinian concessions; whereas among Palestinian refugees,
the predicted odds of responding with ‘‘joy’’ when hearing of a
suicide attack decreased by a multiplicative factor of 0.519
(Wald  6.893, P  0.009) in response to symbolic Israeli
concessions. The practical consequences of such changes in the
popularity of peace deals and the leaders who promote them are
significant. For example, a shift in popularity by a few percentage
points of a political leader who advocates political compromise
over violence can determine the results of an election.†† This has
persistently been the case in the recent history of the Israeli–
Palestinian conflict (21).
Although previous research into judgement and decision-
making has demonstrated the ways in which normative rules of
rationality are systematically violated when people make deci-
sions aimed at achieving instrumental outcomes such as maxi-
mizing profit (9, 10), our results show that people with sacred
values may not reason instrumentally. These results have pow-
erful implications for understanding the trajectory of many
cultural, resource, and political conflicts, implying that when
people transform a resource (such as land), an activity (such as
hunting a particular animal or farming a certain crop) (1), or an
idea (such as obtaining a nuclear weapon) into a sacred value,
attempts to solve disputes in a bargaining setting by focusing on
increasing the costs or benefits of different actions can backfire.
Instead, when dealing with conflicts involving sacred values,
culturally sensitive efforts at identifying symbolic tradeoffs that
involve equitable gains or losses over those values may open up
new channels for peaceful resolution of otherwise intractable
conflicts.‡‡
Methods
Hypothetical Peace Deals.
Palestinian student survey: Experiment 1.
Taboo. Palestinians would recognize the sacred and historic right
of the Jewish people to Israel. There would be two states: a
Jewish state of Israel and a Palestinian state in 99% of the West
Bank and Gaza.
Taboo. On their part, Israel will pay Palestine 1 billion U.S.
dollars a year for 10 years.
Symbolic. On their part, Israel will recognize the historic and
legitimate right of the Palestinians to their own state and
would apologize for all of the wrongs done to the Palestinian
people.
††For example, in the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections, Hamas gained a narrow victory
(44%) over the secular-nationalist party Fateh (41%) in the popular vote, which trans-
lated into a clear majority (57%) of parliamentary seats. Our exit poll indicates that an
upswing in support for Hamas from religious voters who strongly opposed the peace
process and tend to be more supportive of violence was crucial to this result. See ‘‘PSR’s
Exit Poll Results on the Election Day of the Second Palestinian Parliament’’; available at
http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2006/exitplcfulljan06e.html#religiousity.
‡‡To illustrate, Isaac Ben Israel, a former Israeli Air ForceMajorGeneralwho currently heads
his country’s space agency, stated in an interview on June 4, 2006: ‘‘Israel recognizes that
the [Hamas-led] Palestinian government is still completely focused on what it considers
to be its essential principles . . . For Hamas, a refusal to utter the simple words ‘We
recognize Israel’s right to exist’ is clearly an essential part of their core values. Why else
would they suffer the international boycott. . . and let their owngovernmentworkers go
without pay, their people go hungry, and their leaders risk assassination?’’ Ghazi Hamad,
aHamas leader and spokesman for the Palestinian government, stated in an interviewon
June 20, 2006: ‘‘In principle we have no problem with a Palestinian state encompassing
all of our lands within the 1967 borders, with perhaps minor modiﬁcations on a dunam
for dunam basis [10 dunams 1 hectare]. But let Israel apologize for our tragedy in 1948,
and then we can talk about negotiating over our right of return to historic Palestine.’’
From the other side, Ben Israel, drove home the point saying, ‘‘when we feel Hamas has
recognized our right to exist as a Jewish state, then we can deal.’’ In rational-choice
models of decision-making, that something as intangible as an apology should stand in
the way of peace does not readily compute.
a b
c d
Fig. 2. Reponse to peace deals. (a and b) Moral-absolutist Israeli settlers. (c
andd)Moral-absolutist Palestinian refugees.Moral-absolutistswere less likely
to respond with anger or disgust (moral-absolutist Israeli settlers in a), less
likely to feel joy when hearing about a suicide attack (moral-absolutist Pal-
estinian refugees in c), and predicted lower in-group support for violent
opposition (both populations in b and d) when responding to peace deals
involving compromises over their sacred values (Taboo) if the adversarymade
symbolic compromises over one of their own sacred values (Symbolic). All
measures were centered on the grand mean, and error bars report standard
errors. We found the same results for affective responses of Palestinian
students.
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Palestinian student survey: Experiment 2.
Taboo. There would be a two-state solution, resulting in a Jewish
State of Israel and a Palestinian State in the West Bank and
Gaza. Under this deal Palestinians would agree to give up their
sovereignty over East Jerusalem.
Taboo. On their part, Israel will pay each Palestinian family
1,000 U.S. dollars a year for 10 years in economic assistance.
Symbolic. On their part, Israel would formally declare that it gives
up what it believes is its sacred right to the West Bank.
Settler survey: Experiment 1.
Taboo. Israel would give up 99% of Judea and Samaria. Israel
would not absorb any refugees. This treaty would result in two
states: a Jewish state of Israel and a Palestinian state.
Taboo. In return, the United States would give Israel 1 billion
dollars a year for 100 years.
Symbolic. On their part, Palestinians would give up any claims to
their right of return, which is sacred to them.
Settler survey: Experiment 2.
Taboo. Israel would be required to recognize the historic legit-
imacy of the right of Palestinian refugees to return. However,
Israel would not absorb any refugees. This treaty would result in
two states: a Jewish state of Israel and a Palestinian state taking
up 99% of the West Bank and Gaza.
Taboo. In return, the people of the Jewish state of Israel would
be able to live in peace and prosperity, free of the threat of war
or terrorism.
Symbolic. On their part, Palestinians would be required to
recognize the historic and legitimate right of the Jewish people
to Eretz Israel.
Palestinian refugee survey: Experiment 1.
Taboo. Palestinians would be required to give up their right to
return to their lands and homes in Israel. There would be two
states: a Jewish state of Israel and a Palestinian state in the West
Bank and Gaza.
Taboo. In return, the United States and the European Union
would give Palestine 1 billion dollars a year for 100 years.
Symbolic. On their part, Israel would give up what they believe is
their sacred right to the West Bank.
Palestinian refugee survey: Experiment 2.
Taboo. Palestinians would recognize the historic and legitimate
right of the Jewish people to Israel. There would be two states:
a Jewish state of Israel and a Palestinian state in the West Bank
and Gaza. Palestinian refugees would be allowed to settle only
in the state of Palestine, not inside Israel.
Taboo. In return, the Palestinian people would be able to live
in peace and prosperity, free of the fear of Israeli violence and
aggression.
Symbolic. On their part, Israel would symbolically recognize the
historic legitimacy of the right of return.
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